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Hereditary Succession and the Cromwellian Protectorate: The Offer of the Crown Reconsidered.*

...It carries more in it of weight than a meer Title; for upon due consideration you shall find that the whole body of the Law is carried upon this Wheel, it is not a thing that stands on the top meerly, but runs through the whole life and veins of the Law...​[1]​

As the Master of the Rolls, William Lenthall, spoke these words at Whitehall on 11 April 1657, Oliver Cromwell listened patiently. Lenthall was one of a committee of ninety-nine MPs that had been sent to the Lord Protector in order to satisfy his ‘doubts and scruples’ concerning their offer of the Crown embodied in the proposed Parliamentary constitution, the Humble Petition and Advice.  Lenthall’s arguments were like many that Cromwell heard that day and in the numerous other conferences he had with the committee that month. Time and again, he was assured that legal necessity dictated that he should swallow any providential doubts he claimed to harbour and take the title of king. Yet Cromwell remained unconvinced. His answer to Lenthall and the other MPs, two days later, was the admission that kingship was ‘not a title but a name of office that runs through the law’; but Cromwell was sure that is all it was, a ‘name of office plainly implying a Supreme Authoritie’ and could not be ‘stretcht to more’. In the end, ‘signification goes to the thing... and not to the name’; and just as the title had been ‘fixt’ to the office before, ‘so it may have been unfixt’ and given a different name. Ultimately, Cromwell could find nothing ‘of necessity’ in their arguments, only ‘consideration of expedience’ and ‘conveniency’.​[2]​

These are the terms in which the offer of the Crown and the debates around it are usually understood. A group of conservative, ‘civilian’ Cromwellian MPs – many of whom were lawyers – tried desperately to convince Cromwell of the absolute legal necessity of the kingly title. Only by accepting the Commons’ offer of the Crown, could the dubious military foundations of the Protectorate be expunged and the regime placed on a more secure Parliamentary footing. With this framework in mind, historians have looked long and hard at the events of the opening months of the second Protectorate Parliament for the origins of the offer of the Crown. The exclusion of over one hundred MPs, the debates over the Quaker James Naylor and the failure of the Militia Bill have all been suggested as factors that galvanised a ‘civilian’ backlash against the ‘military’ stranglehold over the regime; these events hastened them to push on with their plans to make Cromwell king.

There is something inherently ‘whiggish’ about the way this story of the search for a settlement continues to be told with the offer of the Crown as its inevitable outcome. Anticipating the Restoration of 1660, kingship is seen as the only logical choice for those hoping to rescue the Protectorate from the political turmoil of the previous decade. By reading the impassioned legalistic defence of Cromwellian kingship by Lenthall and others in April 1657, it is tempting to believe that this had been their aim all along. From the opening weeks of the Parliament, those ‘tentative moves’ of the civilian Cromwellians, orchestrated by Lord Broghill and his group of Irish MPs, drove forward a monarchical agenda – by February 1657 it was finally time to bring the plan to fruition.​[3]​ Cromwell, by refusing the offer of the Crown, halted this inexorable march towards monarchy and thereby doomed his regime to certain failure.

A magisterial two-part article by Charles Firth, written over a hundred years ago, indicates the flaws of this approach. For Firth, as for generations of historians after him, Cromwellian kingship was not something which emerged out-of-the-blue with the presentation of the Humble Remonstrance to Parliament by Sir Christopher Packe on 23 February 1657; rather, it had developed organically, after months of testing the political waters both inside and outside Westminster.  After examining a number of motions to alter the mode of Protectoral succession in the autumn of 1656, Firth claims that ‘the restoration of monarchy took originally the form of a demand that the Protectorate should be made hereditary and the question of the precise title to be borne by the supreme magistrate was, at first, of subordinate importance’.​[4]​ But why the title was of subordinate importance, and how it came to be the central issue, Firth never says. Nonetheless, he is confident that in ‘neglecting to notice this agitation about the succession to the Protectorate historians have omitted to mark the first stage in the evolution of the Petition and Advice.’​[5]​

But Firth never finishes his story; he fails to make clear the linkages between this ‘first stage’ and what followed.​[6]​  In particular, he does not address the most obvious hole in his argument: the complete absence of a hereditary clause from the Parliamentary constitution of 1657, which left the succession to Cromwell’s nomination instead.  If hereditary succession really was such an important precursor to the offer of the Crown it seems strange that it was dropped from the constitutional package that followed. This article argues that the omission of hereditary succession from the settlement of 1657 is another one of those Cromwellian ‘deafening silences’ that provides us with a deeper understanding of the constitutional priorities of both Cromwell and those around him.​[7]​

Timing is everything. It is misleading to assume that those behind the Parliamentary offer of the Crown in February 1657 were holding back until the ‘time was right’; that the plans for kingship had been ‘secretly maturing’ for several months.​[8]​ This is not to deny that many in the Parliament were thinking of constitutional reform from an early stage; but the kind of reform they sought initially was markedly different to what eventually emerged in Packe’s Humble Remonstrance. Firth, convinced of the ineluctability of the offer of the Crown, was too ready to read those earlier motions for hereditary government as lightly veiled requests for Cromwellian kingship. In reality, hereditary succession was not a means to an end; it was an end in itself. Rather than marking a process of inevitable backsliding towards monarchy, the constitutional debates during the opening months of the 1656 Parliament can best be understood by consideration of previous succession crises. In their demands to make the government hereditary, there are clear echoes of Elizabeth I’s reign when MPs tried desperately to pre-empt the likely chaos of an undetermined succession.​[9]​ Survival was everything; the growing awareness of Cromwell’s mortality – as with Elizabeth – made Parliament increasingly determined to find a solution which would secure the regime’s continuity; but their initial solution was an hereditary Protectorate rather than a Cromwellian monarchy. Only by explaining why – and when – these demands for a hereditary Protectorate transformed into a constitutional settlement which prioritised non-hereditary monarchy can we penetrate the aspirations of those who offered Cromwell the Crown and the true manner in which the new constitution came into being. 
---

If there was one word that summed up the concerns of Parliament when it assembled in 1656 it was ‘security’.  The tone was set with Cromwell’s opening speech on 17 September, which was packed full of warnings of assassination plots and imminent dangers from the formidable double act of ‘Papists and Cavaliers’ aided and abetted by members of the ‘Levelling Party’.  Cromwell played to his audience; he was desperate to finance the faltering war effort against Spain and eager to defend what he called the ‘little poor invention’ of the Major-Generals. In doing so he emphasised, even over-exaggerated, the perilous state of affairs.​[10]​  He berated Parliament for their inability to recognise these threats the last time they had sat in 1654. The warnings about attempts on Cromwell’s life had been ‘no fable’; the foiled Gerard plot of May 1654 and Penruddock’s rising in the spring of 1655 had been real enough, even if pathetic failures.  As Cromwell reflected bitterly ‘all the time the Parliament sat’, he ‘did hint these things to them, the Parliament people’, but ‘nothing was believed’.​[11]​ Moreover, as Cromwell revealed dramatically, there had been several attempts on his life since. Although these were mostly ‘foolish designs’, they were indicative of a consistent agenda among the enemies of the regime; they hoped to capitalise on the likely chaos which would follow Cromwell’s sudden death. This was the ‘state wherein we have stood in’, Cromwell lamented ‘and with which we have conflicted, since the last Parliament’.​[12]​

Taking heed of Cromwell’s warnings, much of Parliament’s early efforts were dedicated to the issue of security and provide the context for the discussion on hereditary succession that would follow.  On 18 September 1656 – the day following Cromwell’s speech – Sir Charles Wolseley, a leading civilian Cromwellian MP and member of the Council, brought in an ‘act for renouncing and disannulling the pretended title of Charles Stuart’.  The content of this Act was straightforward enough; in order for the ‘better establishment of Peace of this Commonwealth’, Parliament ‘in the Name of all this Commonwealth, fully, freely, absolutely, and for ever disclaim and renounce all Fealty, Homage, or Allegiance, pretended to be due to Charles Stuart’ or any other member of the Stuart family. They were ‘utterly excluded and debarred from holding or enjoying the Crown of England, Scotland and Ireland’ or from having the ‘Name, Title, Stile, or Dignity of King or Queen of Great Britain’. If ‘any person or persons shall endeavour or attempt by force of Arms or otherwise... the reviving or setting up of any pretended Right, Title or Claim’ of Charles or his relatives then ‘every such Offence shall be, and is hereby deemed and adjudged High Treason’.  After its second reading on 19 September the Bill was then sent to a committee of which the first named member was Lord Broghill.  Brought in and read for a third time on 26 September the Act was passed nemine contradicente and was ready for the Lord Protector’s approval.​[13]​

A complimentary piece of legislation emerged on 23 September.  Entitled an ‘act for the security of the Lord Protector his Person, And Continuance of the Nation in Peace and Safety’, it addressed directly the fears raised by recent assassination attempts against Cromwell. As the opening preamble made clear ‘the Prosperity and Safety of this Nation...very much dependeth (under God) upon the Security and Preservation of the person of his Highness’. Echoing Cromwell’s opening speech, the Bill emphasised how ‘divers wicked Plots and means have been of late devised and laid, as well in Foreign parts beyond the Seas, as also within this Nation, to the great endangering His Highness Person, and the embroyling this Commonwealth in new and intestine Wars’. Atoning for their predecessors’ inaction on this matter, the Parliament ‘out of a deep sense and consideration thereof’ enumerated a litany of misdemeanours, including to ‘Attempt, Compass or Imagine the death of the Lord Protector’, which were ‘Deemed, Ordained and Adjudged to be High Treason’. The Bill gave authority for a body of commissioners to ‘hear and determine all the matters, crimes and offences aforesaid’ against any who were named ‘by the Lord Protector, with the advice and consent of his Council’; and to ‘to proceed to Conviction and final Sentence, as in cases of High Treason’.​[14]​

The Treason Act was read for the second time and committed on 26 September – the same day that the Act renouncing Charles Stuart’s title was completed. On 1 October, the committee recommended that the Act be extended to Scotland and Ireland as well. Eight days later, the Bill was read for the third time and amended. Among the suggestions made was that ‘three of the Judges’ should be among the quorum of seventeen commissioners. The matter was put to the vote but was defeated almost two to one. Similar proposals to have at least two, and then just one judge, as part of the quorum of commissioners were also defeated without division.  Although some in the Commons were worried about upholding legal standards, the majority – including many future advocates of ‘civilian’ settlement – were quite willing to invest judicial authority in treason cases to a body which might not contain a single judge. With these alterations made the Act was then approved for ‘his Highness’s consent’​[15]​

Historians have failed to grasp the significance of these two security Acts. The Venetian Ambassador Francesco Giavarina, writing in mid-October 1656, was convinced that ‘of all the acts passed by parliament so far they attach most importance to two’: ‘The first is against the House of Stuart’ and ‘the second is to protect his Highness and preserve internal peace... the intention being to consolidate the government and make it durable and longlived’.​[16]​ This was what most concerned MPs – how to ensure the Protectorate’s survival; how to provide for its continuance beyond the life of one man. 

No one in Parliament yet suggested that Cromwellian kingship was the likeliest means to achieve this. The new treason legislation redefined the crime by unhinging it from the title of king and grafting it onto that of Lord Protector; thereby separating the office and title of king in a manner which later defendants of the offer of the Crown – such as Lenthall – claimed to be intolerable and illegal. If anything, the new Treason Act was a Parliamentary vote of confidence in, or at least the first recognition of, the title of Lord Protector; it gave the Protectorate the Parliamentary approbation it hitherto lacked.  Moreover these two security Acts prepared the ground for the calls for hereditary Protectorate that were to follow.  Having ensured that Charles Stuart was permanently barred from the supreme magistracy and that all would-be assassins would be severely punished, the settlement of the succession was a natural progression to ensure that nothing was left to chance should the worst happen.  

The mode of Protectoral succession, as defined under the Protectorate’s founding constitution The Instrument of Government, gave little comfort to those hoping for a smooth and certain transition of power. Article thirty-two of the Instrument stated emphatically that the ‘office of Lord Protector over these nations shall be elective and not hereditary’.  The election was entrusted to the Council – but they could make their choice only after the death of the incumbent Lord Protector.​[17]​  The potential pitfalls of this arrangement were not lost on the MPs, many of whom voiced their misgivings as they dissected the Instrument during the first Protectorate Parliament in late 1654. The Parliament’s diarist, Guibon Goddard, provides a summary of their fears, which ranged from the many ill-effects of a prolonged ‘Interregnum’ to the possibility of the electors – whether Council or Parliament – choosing to bring in ‘Charles Stuart or his family’.​[18]​ In 1654, Parliament agreed that the succession should remain elective rather than hereditary; by 1656, however, new security threats necessitated a rethink on the issue. Hereditary succession to the Lord Protectorate was recognised as an infinitely safer option because it would establish a clear, unquestionable, line of succession. It would remove the possibility of a confused, prolonged or contested election which the regime’s enemies could exploit in the wake of Cromwell’s sudden death – whether natural, accidental or at the hands of an assassin.  Thus, while Parliament eradicated the claims of the Stuarts to the supreme magistracy of the three nations on the one hand, they began to moot the possibility of granting hereditary office to the house of Cromwell on the other.

The motions began on 28 October 1656, according to one newsletter, when there was ‘started a question concerning the election of successive Protectors as itt was now setled in the Instrument’ especially ‘as to the safety of itt’. The motion was tentative, and ‘noe conclusion made, butt adjourned without putting any question whether any further debate should bee of itt or noe’.​[19]​ That same day, John Thurloe confirms that ‘there was a motion made... by an Irish gentleman, to take into consideration the 31st [i.e. the 32nd] article of the government’ concerning the succession, ‘but it went of[f] without the puttinge of any question’.​[20]​ Although sparse, this information is most intriguing. The ‘Irish gentleman’ to which Thurloe refers is probably a member of Broghill’s circle of Irish MPs; most likely, member for Cork and Youghal William Jephson. ​[21]​ This motion marked only the beginning; throughout November the calls for hereditary succession kept on coming. 

From the outset, the key issue on the agenda was ‘hereditary’ succession, but this was not simply a synonym for kingship. Whenever details of these motions for hereditary government were enumerated it was understood that Cromwell would keep his existing title; that he would become hereditary Protector. On 7 November, Giavarina noted how Parliament had ‘taken up’ the issue of succession, ‘which they wish to make hereditary in the house of his Highness’, but also heard that Cromwell ‘resists the proposals on this question’. ​[22]​  A week later he reported that Parliament had sent ‘a special deputation of its members’ who ‘intimated to the Protector its desire to render that high office hereditary in his family’. ​[23]​  Yet the proposal stalled – not least because Cromwell, in response, went on to ‘decline the honour, and in an eloquent speech... set forth the reasons which impel him to refuse’. When Parliament again resolved to discuss the succession on 19 November, ‘Cromwell sent to ask them to do nothing’, to which ‘the members gave way but appointed another day next week’ to settle the business, instead.​[24]​ Almost three months before the ‘kingship crisis’, there was already a familiar pattern emerging. On the one hand, the civilian, conservative elements of Parliament – led by Broghill and his band of Irish MPs – were pressing a reluctant Cromwell to accept hereditary succession.  On the other hand, the military group – most notably the Major-Generals – were becoming a roadblock to constitutional change.  Referring to the events on 14 November, the French Ambassador Bordeaux noted how, ‘they made another proposal in parliament in favour of the succession of the Protector, but the officers of the army seemed as hostile as they were before’.​[25]​  On 6 December the Royalist agent Silius Titus, writing from Antwerp, had news of the growing division in the House: ‘there are great disputes about the Government, whether it shall be successive or elective, the soldiery part of the howse are for the latter, the Court partie (as they distinguish them) for the former’.​[26]​

The dynamics of the debate are confirmed by a letter from Irish MP Colonel John Bridges to Henry Cromwell dated 25 November 1656. Four days earlier, Bridges had been involved in a spat in the Speaker’s chamber with Major-General James Berry over the issue of the succession. Although, Major-General John Desborough intervened to stop the pair coming to blows, he ‘sowerly enough’ invited Bridges to put his ‘scattered notions into writing, and hee would answeare them’. Bridges took up the challenge with great alacrity and after some hasty scribbling he caught up with Desborough ‘in the tobacco roome’ and ‘offered him the grounds of my dissent’. His arguments for hereditary succession, which even Desborough admitted were ‘not easily answered’, put great stress on the issue of security – especially in the period following the Protector’s death.  If the elective form of succession embodied in the Instrument continued, then Bridges believed that ‘every man in the nation hath a like right to the government by the death of the Lord Protector’ and therefore ‘uppon every chainge there wilbee a competition’. The election would breed instability and resentment with competitors coming ‘to blowes’ and those who were disappointed likely to look to ‘the Stuart’s lyne’ for relief. If ‘uppon every chainge they shall bee subject to the callamityes of warr’ Bridges could not see ‘what can bee the result but that it’s better to settle upon the olde bottome.’​[27]​  This correspondence also confirms that the hereditary scheme was backed by Lord Broghill and his group of Irish MPs. Indeed, Bridges assured Henry that the difficulty of the situation meant that ‘the nights are very longe at Corke House’.​[28]​ 

But those behind the motions for hereditary government were undeterred by the army’s opposition. On 27 November, for instance, MPs once again highlighted the inexorable link between their concerns for safety and the scheme for hereditary succession.
That morning, the Commons met Cromwell in the Painted Chamber to present, and get the Protector’s assent to, those bills that they had passed during the session so far. These included both the ‘act for disannulling the pretended title of Charles Stuart’ and the ‘act for the security of his Highness the Lord Protector his Person’. After Cromwell had approved these security bills, it appears that a number of MPs then seized the moment to solicit Cromwell directly on the issue of hereditary succession. Giavarina reveals how, ‘some of the most devoted of the members tried to raise the question of the succession’ but, once again ‘it was put aside by his Highness who compelled them not to go any further.’​[29]​

Thereafter, discussion on hereditary succession went quiet for a while. Although not completely dead, it was put on the backburner throughout December while the house devoted its time to tedious debate on the case of James Naylor. Writing to Lord Wharton on 9 December, Thomas Burton admitted that ‘we looked ere this for that which is the great towne talke to resume the debate about hereditary’; ‘But’, he complained, ‘Naylor’s business has held us soe close these four days that there was noe roome for anything’.​[30]​ On 12 December, Giavarina noted how ‘the succession question, so often discussed in parliament without any result, was again brought forward this week’, but once again it was decided ‘to postpone it to another day’.​[31]​ By 26 December, after a fortnight of silence on the issue, Giavarina feared that the ‘parliamentarians may have cooled and changed their minds about making the Protector’s office hereditary in his family, seeing how silent they have been about it all this time’. Yet with Naylor’s business now concluded it appears that agitation began in earnest. There was ‘talk of some doctors having gone to the Protector to represent the advantages of the business’ of the succession. These lawyers made a forceful argument, which would continue to plague Cromwell throughout the kingship debates the following year: they informed him that he was ‘bound in conscience to accept the honour offered spontaneously to him by parliament as a testimony of their regard and affection and to perpetuate it in his house’. As in April 1657, the lawyers were telling Cromwell that he should not – could not – refuse the advice of his Parliament; they were the sovereign power and sole representative of the people. Yet, at this stage, it was still a hereditary Protectorate that they were trying to foist on Cromwell, not a monarchy. But the lawyers’ arguments ‘made no impression’; Cromwell ‘shut his ears to them... his objection being more pronounced than ever’.​[32]​

---

In response, the military Cromwellians unveiled an alternative plan to prevent future security threats.  Rather than trust in constitutional safeguards, they believed that only a continuation of the rule of the Major-Generals – the system of military rule in the localities funded by a decimation tax on Royalists - could secure the regime. It is in this context that we should place Desborough’s attempt to introduce the infamous ‘Militia Bill’ in a sparsely attended house on Christmas day 1656.  According to Firth, ‘from the introduction of that bill on 7 January 1657 to its rejection on 29 January, no other subject could be seriously considered’ and it was not until February that ‘the way was open for the revival of the discussion about the proposed change in the constitution’.​[33]​ This is wholly inaccurate because, by their very nature, the debates over the Militia Bill were widely recognised as a contest over the constitution. It affirmed the contours of the split between ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ Cromwellians that were already apparent in the early motions for the hereditary succession. Rather than seeing the Militia Bill debates as creating the divisions which would lead ineluctably to the offer of the Crown, they should be read as the military response to the growing groundswell of support for a hereditary Protectorate.  Most revealing in this respect was a conversation recorded by Thomas Burton at the conclusion of the day’s debates on 7 January. Burton found ‘Colonel FitzJames, and divers others, were talking about the decimations’ and FitzJames remarked ‘it was the distinguishing character of those that were against the [Militia] Bill, that they were for hereditary rank’.​[34]​ 

It was just at this moment, as Parliament continued to seek a means to solve the regime’s security issues, that a fresh attempt on Cromwell’s life was brought to light. On the evening of 8 January, Miles Sindercombe, an ex-soldier cashiered in 1654 for his part in an attempted mutiny in Scotland, had conspired to assassinate the Protector by planting an incendiary device in Cromwell’s chapel at Whitehall. But this slow-burning ‘fire-work’ was discovered before it could detonate and Sindercombe, along with his accomplices John Cecil and John Toop, were apprehended the following morning. The examination of the conspirators, which – in the style of James I with Guy Fawkes – saw Cromwell interrogate his would-be assassins personally, threw up some alarming revelations.​[35]​ While Sindercombe remained mute, his companions confessed all. They admitted that this was not their first attempt on Cromwell’s life. They had tried and failed ‘five or six times’ to assassinate the Protector as he rode between London and Hampton Court; with Toop, a member of Cromwell’s lifeguard, providing them with details of the Protector’s movements. Unperturbed by yet another failed assassination attempt in Hyde Park, the conspirators hired a house near Westminster Abbey with the intention of gunning down Cromwell during the ceremonies accompanying the opening of Parliament on 17 September 1656, but large crowds obscured their target.​[36]​

Alarmingly, these plots seemed to be the tip of the iceberg of a much deeper conspiracy. Toop believed that Sindercombe was ‘set on work by the King of Spain’ and was told that they were to have their money ‘from Flanders’. Justifying these assassination attempts, Sindercombe told Toop emphatically that ‘it was better to have Charles Stuart to reign here, than this tyrant’.​[37]​ According to the examination of John Cecil, the real brains behind the plots was a mysterious man named ‘Boyes’, who ‘often went between this place and Flanders’. Boyes assured them ‘that when the protector was dispatched, forces were to come over from Flanders’ and, to that end, had been setting about securing a port town in the west to aid their landing. Although Boyes elaborated no further, it was Cecil’s belief that Leveller-turned-Royalist ‘col. Sexby is the man that doth agitate these affairs at Brussels’.​[38]​ Here was proof positive of the potent alliance of Papists, Cavaliers and Levellers that Cromwell had been so keen to highlight in his opening speech. 

Recently, Patrick Little has suggested that the revelation of Sindercombe’s plot and its manipulation by Thurloe – and, by tenuous extension, Cromwell – is the ‘missing link’ in the story of the offer of the Crown.  Little argues that the connections between the plot and the threat of foreign invasion were over-exaggerated by Thurloe and Cromwell in order to mollify the army at a time when Parliament and Whitehall were working behind the scenes to produce a constitutional package which the military Cromwellians would have found abhorrent. It was all part of an ‘elaborate confidence trick, with the army as the main target’.​[39]​ Little draws attention to a steady stream of ‘misinformation’ from Thurloe to the army officers regarding the Royalist threat. Evidence of Thurloe’s exercise in subterfuge can be found throughout February, but especially during the ‘critical period’ in the days before 23 February 1657 ‘when the new constitution was to be unveiled’. Then, even the Protector himself was busy signing letters to the militia forces in England and Wales ‘ordering them to be on their guard for both a foreign invasion and a domestic insurrection’. On the very day that Packe presented the Remonstrance to Parliament – 23 February – Cromwell sent letters to all militia forces reaffirming the news that Charles was planning an imminent invasion. All this was part of a ‘clever propaganda campaign, masterminded by Thurloe, designed to prevent a mutiny by the army’. ​[40]​

Overall, this theory is unpersuasive.  The, now well-known, shambolic state of the Royalist cause abroad does not prove that Thurloe’s fears of invasion were insincere or fabricated.  Rather, Little’s argument hinges on the fact that ‘the day after the Remonstrance had been presented to the Commons, Thurloe announced suddenly that the threat of invasion had ended’. With the offer of the Crown now out in the open there was no point keeping up the charade. In letters sent on 24 February to both Henry Cromwell and George Monck ​— the commanders of the armies in Ireland and Scotland — Thurloe now admitted that the chances of Charles Stuart landing his forces did ‘somewhat cool’.​[41]​

But if this really was Thurloe’s script then Cromwell forgot his lines. According to the news reporter Gilbert Mabbott, it was 26 February – not 23 February – that Cromwell sent his ‘cautionary letters to all the Militia troops, wherein notice was taken of Charles Stuart’s preparations abroad, and of his intention to land an army this Spring’.​[42]​ Thus, three days after the presentation of Packe’s Remonstrance, the invasion threat continued to linger. Moreover it seems even Thurloe lost the plot with the publication of the 26 February edition of Mercurius Politicus. This publication, described by Little as one of ‘Thurloe’s newsbooks’, was still carrying news of the impending invasion three days after the emergence of the Humble Remonstrance — and two days after Thurloe had assured the army commanders that the threat from Charles Stuart had diminished.​[43]​ This was hardly the coordinated propaganda campaign of a political mastermind.

In reality, the situation regarding the invasion threat remained confused after 23 February 1657. The fact that Thurloe tried to downplay the issue after the emergence of the Remonstrance is probably because he recognised that the invasion threat was more of a hindrance than a help to those advocating constitutional change. Rather than reducing the army to a state of quiet submissiveness, the spectre of an invasion energised them and became a focus for their indignation at the folly of constitutional upheaval in such unsettled times. Charles Fleetwood, for one, complained to Henry Cromwell on 24 February, how ‘when Charles Stuart is in preparation with a considerable army to transport himself into England, men’s minds should now divide about government’. Contrary to Thurloe’s assurances that day, Fleetwood believed that Henry should ‘have your forces in a readines, for it is from very good hands that Charles Stewart intends action very suddenly, and though it is pretended that England is the place intended, yet I cannot thincke Ireland to be secure’.​[44]​ A week later, Fleetwood was still fearful that the ‘common enimy are very active and vigorously dilligent to watch the first opportunity to rise’ and was sure that ‘the king of Scotts hath a considerable force with him, which if he can lande upon English shoare he hopes to have a great accession of forces from his own party heare’. Tellingly, Fleetwood believed he need say no more about this threat because he knew ‘you have an account of all thes things from the Secretary’. If Thurloe was trying to claim the threat of invasion was cooling, Fleetwood – pointing to Thurloe’s earlier reports – was adamant that the threat lingered.​[45]​

It seems that the army leaders never trusted completely in Thurloe’s intelligence or his claims that the threat was over. On the very day, 24 February, that Thurloe was writing to Monck telling him that the designs of the Royalists abroad were fading, Monck was himself writing to Henry Cromwell with his own intelligence that ‘Charles Stuart intends this summer (if monies doe nott fayle him) to give us some trouble both in Ireland and Scotland’. Although ‘Mr Secretary’ had informed Monck that ‘they intend likewise to give them trouble in England’, Monck was doubtful, it not being clear ‘which way they are able to doe itt’.​[46]​ Monck was being fed his own stream of intelligence from the Continent and did not put all of his trust in Thurloe’s information alone. On 26 February, for instance, he wrote directly to the Protector with news ‘I had from an intelligence abroad’ that ‘Charles Stewart hath employed one to hire some shipps for him in Zealand’.​[47]​ On 17 March, by which time Monck must have received Thurloe’s letter dampening expectations of the invasion, he admitted that ‘concerning Charles Stuart, I cannot heare any certaintie of his great readinesse to shippe as yet’, noting that ‘wee heare he wants monies for the carrying on of the business’. At the same time, however, Monck reported how certain ‘Scotts have bin speakeing as though there came some letters to some of them, as though the Dutch would joyne with him in this business’.​[48]​ Clearly, the fear of invasion did not vanish on Thurloe’s assurances alone; intelligence did not flow solely from Thurloe nor was his information entirely trusted by the army’s commanders. 

---

Undoubtedly, Sindercombe’s plot was used for political effect by Thurloe; but rather than a means to dupe the army into accepting the Crown, it was used to remind Parliament to provide the, still, unforthcoming funds for the Spanish War. Thurloe’s comprehensive report of the plot to the Commons on 19 January, which emphasised how the ‘design was hatched... in Flanders... at the Spanish court there’, was calculated to refocus the minds of MPs.​[49]​ Thurloe was not advocating constitutional reform – he was merely parroting the government’s agenda as set out by Cromwell the previous September. But the immediate effect of Thurloe’s revelations on 19 January was not a rush to finance the war with Spain; instead it reminded MPs of the serious security issues predicated upon the safety of Cromwell’s person which, in turn, reenergised discussion concerning the mode of succession.

After a number of MPs rose to profess their thanks to God for Cromwell’s safe deliverance, and voted a day of thanksgiving for the same, debate then turned to future safety. First to speak on the matter was the Presbyterian MP John Ashe the elder who proposed ‘that his Highness would be pleased to take upon him the government according to the ancient constitution, so that the hopes of our enemies’ plots would be at an end’. Building on ‘an old and sure foundation’, Ashe claimed, would ‘tend very much to the preservation of himself and us, and to the quieting of all the designs of our enemies’.​[50]​ His motion was backed by George Downing – a man close to Broghill and his circle. Downing was sure that ‘Government is the foundation of security’ and would ensure the regime’s survival, for ‘men go away, but constitutions never fall’. He could not ‘propound a better expedient for the preservation, both of his Highness and the people, than by establishing the government upon the old and tried foundation’.​[51]​ Undoubtedly, as Clive Holmes suggests, there was a call for Cromwellian kingship ‘encoded in this language’; here were the first hints of a plan not just for hereditary succession but for a restoration of the ancient constitution of three estates.​[52]​ Clearly, there was some blurring of the languages of ‘hereditary’ government and ‘kingship’; unlike the motions of late 1656, where the title was not discussed, some MPs were suggesting that both the mode of succession and the title of the supreme magistrate should be changed. One army newsletter even summarised the Parliamentary debates on 19 January by reporting that ‘for the better security of the nation’ it was moved that ‘a kingly and hereditary government might be speedily settled’.​[53]​ But, it appears that many civilian MPs still prioritised hereditary government during this debate; the issue of kingship was raised but it was subsumed into that of the hereditary succession. They understood the ‘old and tried foundation’ in debate to be hereditary government in general, rather than kingly government specifically.

Context is important here – the civilian MPs, ruminating on the implications of Thurloe’s revelations earlier that day, were determined to find a solution to the Instrument’s elective system of succession that had, once again, been powerfully exposed. Griffith Bodurda, for one, feared ‘the consequence’ if ‘either a natural or an accidental death should happen to his Highness’ under the current arrangements and thought it was ‘well worth a serious debate’.​[54]​ Samuel Highland, seeing where the debates were going, and no doubt with one eye on Richard Cromwell, interjected angrily by demanding ‘can he beget a fit governor?’; he believed that ‘a Parliament’ or ‘a Council’ were just as well equipped to ‘choose such an one’ instead.​[55]​   Clearly, those who heard Ashe’s motion saw it as a cue to debate the succession. Sir Thomas Wroth, seeing that it was ‘so pressed upon account of preservation, and safety of the nation’ believed that the motion demanded a ‘full and serious debate’. He did not doubt that ‘weighty arguments may be brought as well against as for, hereditary government’, adding he knew ‘not what else can be meant by that motion’ of Ashe and others.​[56]​ 

Sindercombe’s plot had highlighted the fundamental fragility of the Protectorate; it was simply untenable for the survival of the regime to rest on the life of one man. Remarkably, however, these motions for hereditary government went dead almost immediately. The diarist Thomas Burton was perplexed: ‘The debate fell asleep’, he wrote, ‘I know not how...I have not seen so hot a debate vanish so strangely, like an ignis fatuus’. Tellingly, Burton believed the motion was dropped ‘by consent’ and had heard Master of Requests Nathaniel Bacon, among others, say as they left the Chamber that it was ‘only started by way of probation’.​[57]​ 

---

Burton had every right to be confused. Despite all the debate, and the constant motions during the opening months of the Parliament, the issue appeared to disappear into thin air. When the Humble Remonstrance emerged a month later there was no mention of hereditary government; non- hereditary kingship was now the lynchpin of the proposed settlement. But surely the issue did not just evaporate like a Will-o-the-wisp? It will be the contention of the remainder of this article that the silence on this issue, in the weeks running up to the emergence of Packe’s Remonstrance, is deafening. 

Certainly, those fears about the regime’s safety on which the motions for hereditary succession were based did not vanish overnight. Even after 19 January, the dangers facing Cromwell’s life, and the implications of these threats for political stability, continued to be voiced in Parliament and in print.  On 23 January, for instance, the Commons attended Cromwell at the Banqueting House to ‘congratulate with him for the late great Mercy and Deliverance’ from Sindercombe’s plot. Although this should have been a moment of relief, the address from Speaker Thomas Widdrington to Cromwell instead warned of the on-going threats to the Protector’s life despite Sindercombe’s failure. Widdrington was sure ‘the Devil... will not let his emissaries be idle, but be alwayes contriving’; and that ‘since this design would not take, how another may be laid, that what one could not effect, another may’.​[58]​ Likewise, an anonymous letter ‘from Edenburg’, which was given top billing on the front cover of the 4 February edition of the government newsbook Mercurius Politicus, portrayed Sindercombe’s plot as evidence that ‘Charls Stuart thinks his debauched ranting Remnants will hardly be able to effect anything upon England so long as his Highness is alive’. It was therefore crucial that:
the People of these Nations... set our selves to use our utmost endeavors for the preservation of his Highness person, and to come to such a settlement as may secure him and us, and after him the preservation of this Cause and of the Publick peace, that it may not be in the Power of any Villain to aime at our Confusion.​[59]​
This letter stated loud and clear the agenda of the civilian Cromwellian group in Parliament in late January 1657. The only way to dash the hopes of would-be assassins was to remove the root cause of those hopes. They had to settle the succession before Cromwell’s death to ensure that the regime could survive ‘after him’.

So, if those fears for constitutional chaos upon Cromwell’s sudden death remained, why did the civilian Cromwellian MPs go silent on the issue of succession? One obvious reason was continued opposition from the army grandees. When they responded to Ashe’s motion on 19 January, the military Cromwellians re-emphasised their own plan for maintaining the security of the regime. John Desborough sidestepped the issue of hereditary succession, claiming that constitutional reform would be a ‘slender prop’ for Cromwell unless they first take ‘care to secure his enemies’. Instead, Desborough, who insisted that the continuation of the Major-Generals was the only way to counter these threats, implored the house to adjourn until the following day and then ‘take up the debate upon the [Militia] Bill before you’.​[60]​  In response, the civilian Cromwellians decided to follow Desborough’s advice; they resolved to tackle the Militia Bill head-on, to remove once-and-for-all the army officers’ alternative blueprint for the regime’s ‘security’. As the Irish MP Vincent Gookin explained on 27 January, many of the civilians feared that the passing of the Militia Bill would mean that ‘his highness government will be more founded in force, and more removed from the natural foundation, which the people in parliament are desirous to give him’. Gookin had no doubt that underpinning the debates over the Militia Bill was a contest over the succession; the continuation of the Major Generals was a ploy to ensure that military Cromwellian machinations for the succession were secured. The army officers had little interest in making the Protectorate hereditary; it was to their advantage to retain the elective form of succession embodied in the Instrument while simultaneously entrenching their position within the regime. Gookin was sure that, ‘if any others have pretensions to succeed him by their interest in the army’ then ‘the more of force upholds his highness living, the greater when hee is dead will be the hopes and advantages for such a one to effect his ayme, who desires to succeed him’.​[61]​ Far from securing the regime, Gookin and his fellow civilian MPs believed that continuing the rule of the Major-Generals would merely deepen a crisis at the death of the Protector, with the election of his successor becoming a contest between factions within the army. 

Yet military Cromwellian resistance was not the sole, or most important, factor that drove the civilian Cromwellians into silence on the issue of succession after 19 January 1657. Even when the Militia Bill was finally rejected on 29 January by a vote of 124 to 88, there was apparently no immediate rush to discuss the hereditary succession in the Commons. According to Thurloe, the Major-Generals did ‘thinke themselves much trampled upon by this vote, and are extreamely sensible thereof’. Indeed the debate over the Bill had ‘wrought such a heate in the house’ that Thurloe feared ‘little will be done for the future’.​[62]​ But the wounded pride of the Major-Generals only partly explains the momentary silence in Parliament over the constitution. The military Cromwellian plan for settlement was defeated, but the civilian Cromwellians still has some way to go to prepare the ground for their plans for hereditary succession. As Bacon made clear on 19 January, it had been raised ‘by way of probation’; thereafter it became the subject of intense behind-the-scenes manoeuvring, which included testing Cromwell’s pulse, to ensure that the constitutional package met with the approval of its intended beneficiary.

---

In his letter to George Monck on 24 February 1657, the day after Packe’s Remonstrance was presented to the Commons, Thurloe was adamant that the document ‘arises from the parlament only; His Highness knew nothinge of the particulars untill they were brought into the house’.​[63]​ Thurloe was on a mission; he was trying to dispel the army’s suspicions that the Lord Protector had a hand in the new constitution. But the army were right to be suspicious – this was not be the first time in Cromwell’s political career that he claimed to be oblivious to  the glaringly obvious signs around him; in Blair Worden’s nice phrase, ‘Cromwell was practised at not knowing’.​[64]​ The month before the presentation of the Humble Remonstrance was another one of those occasions when Cromwell feigned ignorance.


That fact that Parliament continued sitting during this period was itself evidence of some connivance from the Protector. The second Protectorate Parliament had been summoned out of the usual sequence of triennial parliaments, as stipulated under the Instrument of Government; it was an extraordinary parliament called to meet the pressing financial demands of the war with Spain.​[65]​ As such, it only needed to sit for a minimum of three months before it could be dissolved by the Protector. By mid-December 1656, with parliamentary debate stalling over the issue of Nayler, it was feared that the blow would come sooner rather than later. On 9 December, three lunar months after the Parliament had opened, Burton notes how the Commons sat ‘sat till almost nine’, debating Nayler’s business ‘it being the last night of the natural life of this Parliament’.​[66]​ But, despite Cromwell’s misgivings about Nayler’s fate, he did nothing to intervene; in stark contrast to his dealings with the first Protectorate Parliament, when he dissolved Parliament at the soonest possible juncture, he allowed this Parliament to continue sitting. Of course, Cromwell still needed money to fund the Spanish war. Giavarina was sure that this was Parliament’s lifeline. On 2 January, Giavarina assured his masters that ‘the hope of seeing some decision about money’ meant Cromwell had postponed the dissolution, ‘though it will undoubtedly follow as soon as supplies have been secured’.​[67]​ Not so. On 30 January 1657, the day after the defeat of the Militia Bill, Parliament voted £400,000 ‘for carrying on the War with Spaine’.​[68]​ At last, Cromwell had the money he needed; but Parliament still did not come to an end. Even though the government’s agenda — as set out in the opening speech and reinforced in the wake of Sindercombe’s plot — had now been fulfilled, the Parliament was allowed to continue. 

Cromwell was certainly aware that something was in agitation. In late January 1657, Henry Cromwell wrote to Broghill from Ireland expressing his thanks that he had been ‘so plaine with his Highness in that matter of greatest concernement’. What this great matter was Henry did not say, but he was sure that his father ‘cannot bee safe unlesse he follow some such advice as your lordship gave him, but must expose these nations and his family to much calamity’.​[69]​ The final phrase here is instructive; the direct reference to the safety of the nation and Cromwell’s family, and the dangers to both if action was not taken, hint that Broghill was urging Cromwell to take a hereditary title. In a pun, which played on both his father’s predilection to seek God on such issues, and stressed the necessity of Broghill’s continued guidance from behind the scenes, Henry was certain that if ‘the Lord shall encourage him to this worke, I dare undertake His interest here will not bee found inconsiderable towards it’. 
Indeed, Henry was himself trying to convince his father of the necessity of constitutional change. He was adamant that ‘now is the time of doing somewhat to purpose, the designes of the major generalls being now become visibly dangerous, and especially his Highness having so complyant and well affected a parliament to back him therein, and the sober people beeing withall generally big with hopes of seeing that good day of settlement’. ​[70]​ Interestingly, Henry informed Broghill that these sentiments he ‘had not long since beene bold to intimate to his Highnesse himself’. This is corroborated by Thurloe who noted the receipt of a sensitive letter from Henry to his father on 3 February and added the intriguing comment that the Protector ‘doth very well accept what you have said therein’. The exact content of the letter will remain a mystery, however, for ‘when he read it, he burnt it’.​[71]​  

Besides the correspondence with his son and the visits from Lord Broghill, it appears Cromwell consulted privately with a number of other confidants about the propriety of constitutional change during February 1657. On 3 February, Vincent Gookin revealed how ‘[William] Pierpoint and [Oliver] Snt John have been often, but secretly, at Whitehall... to advise’ about ‘a reducing of the government to kingship’.​[72]​ Bulstrode Whitelocke also claims that Cromwell often entertained a number of leading civilian MPs at Whitehall during this period – including ‘L[ord] Broghill, Pierrepont, Wh[itelocke], Sir Charles Oulseley & Thurlo[e]’. At these private meetings, sometimes lasting ‘3 or 4 hours’, Cromwell would put ‘aside his greatnes’ and make ‘verses with them’ and ‘commonly called for tobacco pipes’ before turning to serious matters and advising with them on ‘his serious and great buisnes’.​[73]​  In light of these backroom conversations it would be naive to believe that Cromwell knew ‘nothing of the particulars’ of the settlement before they emerged on 23 February 1657. Equally, it is contentious whether the Humble Remonstrance was the work of Parliament alone;  it seems a distinct possibility that, after direct consultation with Cromwell, a central pillar of the proposed constitution – the hereditary succession – was dropped in deference to his wishes.

Of course, Cromwell’s dislike of the hereditary principle was no secret. His feelings are best summed up in his tirade to the first Protectorate Parliament on 22 January 1655; where he stated emphatically that if ‘this Government should have been placed in my family hereditarily, I would have rejected it’. It was better to ‘have men chosen, for their love of God, and Truth and Justice’ than to have it hereditary.​[74]​ His feelings did not change during the 1656 Parliament – as seen by his numerous rebuttals to the MPs’s attempts to discuss the issue of the hereditary succession in late 1656. Hardly believing that Cromwell would refuse an opportunity to set up his family in such an exalted position, the Venetian ambassador assumed that ‘all his excuses are a sham’.​[75]​  But amidst his persistent refusals, even Giavarina, for a fleeting moment, confessed that ‘it may be he really means it’ because ‘in his innermost self he knows that none of his sons after his death would be capable of directing that great machine’ because ‘their backs’ were ‘none too strong and capable... to bear so heavy a burden’.​[76]​ Perhaps Cromwell did harbour such doubts about his sons’ capabilities, but Giavarina could not accept that Cromwell refused hereditary succession on principle; he failed to see that it was a matter of conscience.

So, was the hereditary succession dropped from the Remonstrance in deference to Cromwell’s wishes? The timing of the change is highly suggestive. On 16 February the Scottish Protestor Sir Archibald Johnston of Wariston had heard that ‘the great busines of the hereditary gouvernment comes on this week’.​[77]​ Wariston was also certain that this ‘great business’ would come into Parliament on 20 February, the day of thanksgiving ‘appoynted for our fasting and praying togither’ in recognition of Cromwell’s deliverance from Sindercombe’s plot. If made perfect sense – the hereditary government would be presented on the very day when minds and prayers were focused upon Cromwell’s latest brush with death. Giavarina, writing on the day of thanksgiving, even went so far as to speculate that ‘his Highness’ would ‘be presented with the crown’ during a sumptuous feast held by the Protector at Whitehall for the Parliament that evening; his reasoning being that ‘the succession was brought up again’ in Parliament ‘some days ago and they speak as if it was decided’.​[78]​ All this suggests that, just days before the Humble Remonstrance actually emerged, it was still understood that hereditary succession would form a central part of the proposed Parliamentary constitution.

The banquet at Whitehall on 20 February between Protector and Parliament marked the turning point. The following day, Wariston revised his earlier predictions and stated that the ‘Bill anent the Gouverment’ was now to ‘com in on Monday’ 23 February, but without ‘the clause anent [the] House of Lords, or [for] making the gouvermnent hereditarye’.​[79]​ So, what had changed? The festivities on 20 February certainly had the feel of one of Cromwell’s private get-togethers with his close-confidants as described by Whitelocke. True, the ‘sumptuous’ feast at Banqueting-house was pretty staid, but ‘after Dinner’ Cromwell dropped the formalities and invited MPs back to his private residence, ‘the Cockpit’, and ‘there entertained them with rare Musick, both of Instruments and Voyces, till the evening’.​[80]​ Was the room smoke-filled? Probably. And, just like those meetings described by Whitelocke, it seems likely that song and smoke were mingled with shop talk.

That Cromwell had been negotiating with MPs over the terms of the settlement is not far-fetched. After all, he had already been in consultation with a number of them throughout February. An intriguing slip in a speech made almost a year later, at the dissolution of the Parliament, hints at the nature of these negotiations. Cromwell chided the Commons for failing to accept the newly created ‘Other House’; he was adamant that the nominated upper chamber had been central to his vision for the new settlement. ‘I did tell you, at a Conference concerning it’, he complained:
that I would not undertake it [i.e. the settlement], unless there might be some other Persons between me and the House of Commons... to prevent tumultuary and popular spirits: and it was granted I should name another House.​[81]​
But when did this conference take place? According to Carlyle, the meeting must have been ‘one of the Kingship Conferences’, in April 1657, ‘of which there is no Report’.​[82]​ Unlikely; the ‘Other House’ had been a confirmed part of the new constitutional settlement ever since Packe presented the Humble Remonstrance on 23 February 1657. There was no reason for Cromwell to demand an upper chamber after that date because it was already written into the constitution. So Cromwell’s ultimatum, that he ‘would not undertake’ the settlement unless it provided for an upper chamber, must have occurred before the proposed constitution was presented to the House of Commons, at a time when the status of the new upper chamber was not assured.​[83]​

Indeed, it probably happened on the evening of 20 February 1657, as he made merry with the MPs. It was not unknown for Cromwell to say one thing and mean another. When he spoke of his council, he often meant the army officers; when he spoke of Parliamentary conferences, he could just have well meant an informal get-together with MPs.​[84]​ As Wariston noted, the clause for the ‘House of Lords’ was the matter of some uncertainty at that very moment and Cromwell was probably keen to put an end to the MPs’ wavering on the issue.​[85]​ For Cromwell, the new upper chamber – not kingship – was the crux of the new constitution. As he told a group of one hundred army officers on 27 February 1657, he was indifferent to the ‘Tytle’ of king – it was ‘a feather in a Hatt’ - but the Other House was vital; unless they had ‘some such thing as a balance you can not be safe’, he warned – only an upper chamber could protect ‘the civil liberties’ and ‘your liberties in religion’.​[86]​  

By extension, it is likely that the sudden removal of the proposed hereditary succession was another one of those ‘conditions’, which Cromwell made contingent for his acceptance of the new settlement. In the same speech of 4 February 1658, Cromwell praised the settlement because it made neither ‘hereditary lords nor hereditary... kings’.​[87]​ Of course, whether this meant that Cromwell had any objections to elected or nominated kings is tantalisingly hazy; he certainly had no problem with the nominated ‘lords’ of his Other House. But the key here is that, throughout his political career, Cromwell was consistent in asserting his disdain for the notion of hereditary office. Try as they might, the civilian Cromwellian MPs could not convince him to accept it; as in late 1656, their attempts met with the same stony response. The significance here is immense: even before Cromwell refused the crown, the Parliamentary constitution of 1657 was based upon a compromise.  Because Oliver was unwilling to swallow hereditary succession, it was replaced – at relatively short notice – by a nominative process instead.  

The form that this compromise took was not too dissimilar to an idea that had been raised in the debates between military and civilian Cromwellians in the previous autumn. It will be remembered that during their spat in late November, Desborough had conceded that John Bridges’s arguments for hereditary succession were ‘not easily answered’.  But Desborough also stressed the many ‘inconveniencies’ if the constitution was suddenly altered from an elective to a hereditary system; not least the jealousy of a number of army officers. In response, Bridges offered ‘as a present expedient, that his Highness might nominate his immediate successor, and tolde the greate and only objection of jealousy would be removed, for doubtles hee would nominate such a one as hee [i.e. Desborough] should have noe cause to suspect’. According to Bridges, Desborough liked this expedient, ‘and soe doe all officers of the army and others I speake with’.​[88]​ 

But the civilian Cromwellians were not looking to please the army; instead they pressed on with their demands for hereditary succession into January 1657. Now, however, with Cromwell refusing to accept a settlement that contained hereditary succession, it seems the civilian Cromwellians fell back onto this compromise. Wariston hints at this in his diary entry for 18 February 1657, when he was informed by ‘Mr Naye’ that ‘a King would com in by the nixt successor and in another familye’ – the implication being that hereditary succession would be put on hold until Cromwell’s death.​[89]​ Traces of this compromise can be found in the wording of the proposed constitution. According to the Humble Remonstrance:
. . .your Highnesse will be pleased in your life time to appoint & Declare who shall imediately after your death suceede you in the Government of these Nations...​[90]​
Read narrowly, this article was a personal grant to Cromwell and concerned his ‘immediate’ successor only. No mention was made of the mode of succession for those that came after Cromwell; the grant was to ‘your Highnesse’ only, not to his ‘Highness and his successors’.​[91]​ Perhaps the clause had been phrased carefully to leave it suitably ambiguous. It left the door open for hereditary succession in the long term while leaving Cromwell (and the military men) satisfied. For the immediate future, at least, there would be no hereditary succession.

This last-minute decision to drop hereditary succession did not leave much time to redraft the proposed constitutional document. According to the French Ambassador Bordeaux, a copy of the Act concerning the ‘Royalty’ had already been seen in the hands of Cromwell’s son Richard, of all people, on 19 February, the day before the banquet at Whitehall.​[92]​ Clearly, an early draft of the Humble Remonstrance was already doing the rounds before the decision to drop hereditary succession was taken; it is even tempting to think that Richard was checking the clause that designated him as heir to the throne. The rewrite of the Remonstrance must have been a hasty one, for the version presented by Packe on 23 February still carried hints of the demand for hereditary succession. Most noticeably, the preamble emphasised the dangers to Cromwell ‘from the bloody practices . . .of the . . . discontented party . . . it being a received principle amongst them that (no person being declared to succeed you in the government) nothing is wanting to bring us into blood and confusion and them to their desired ends but the destruction of your person’. There were also intimations of the dynastic machinations of the document – the preamble highlighted the security Act of the previous November whereby ‘Charles Stuart son of the late king, and all other his sons and posterity... are most justly barred from holding the crowns of England’; while ‘God . . . puts down one and sets up another, and giveth the kingdoms of the world to whomsoever he pleaseth’. But despite these traces, there was no hereditary clause in the constitutional document itself. Instead, Cromwell ‘for the preventing such confusions and inconveniences that otherwise may ensure upon your death’ had to declare his successor in his lifetime.​[93]​ Crucially, there was no formal mechanism or timeframe stipulated to ensure this nomination happened – the probability of Cromwell dying suddenly without a designated successor was therefore still a strong one. So why did the supporters of the Humble Petition still feel that the revised constitution was a more secure foundation for settlement than hereditary government? The answer can be found in the offer of the Crown. 

Although kingship had been on the Parliamentary radar since January 1657, it was always part and parcel with the hereditary succession. This affected significantly the emphasis that many future ‘kinglings’ put on the title of king. Although they would later stress the absolute necessity and legality of the title, prior to the removal of the hereditary clause it appears that the matter was never so critical. In other words, the ways in which the civilian MPs conceptualised and defended non-hereditary monarchy were fundamentally different to their earlier arguments in favour of hereditary government.

---

A case in point is the Lord Chief Justice of the Upper Bench, John Glynne. He was a key player in bringing about the new constitution; according to the Presbyterian MP Robert Beake, Glynne was one of the ‘caball’ who ‘with singuler industry did... prepare the thing without doores and with as much prudence managed it within doors’.​[94]​ By April 1657, he was one of the leading members of the committee of ninety-nine MPs charged with the task of convincing Cromwell to accept the Crown. He was certain that the office of king was inseparable from the title – it ‘cannot be transmitted to another name’, he explained, ‘without much labour, great hazard, if it may at all’. Only the title of king – he assured Cromwell – could ‘protect the people and bind the people to obey you’.​[95]​ 

But rewind to 9 February 1657, just a fortnight before the presentation of Packe’s Remonstrance, and we find Glynne making a wholly different argument as he presided over the trial of Miles Sindercombe. Interestingly, the case was not determined by a panel of commissioners, as stipulated by the new treason legislation, but was heard in Upper Bench and determined by a jury of twelve ‘Gentlemen of worth and quality’.​[96]​ Although the indictment against Sindercombe stated plainly that he did ‘maliciously, and traiterously... conspire, compass, and imagine the death of the said Lord Protector’, the new Treason Act, which defined high treason in precisely these terms, was ignored. Instead, Glynne chose to summarise Sindercombe’s crimes with reference to the common law. That is ‘by the Common Law to compass or imagine the death of the chief Magistrate of the Land, by what name soever he was called, whether Lord Protector or otherwise, is High treason, he being the chief Magistrate, and the spring of Justice, in whose name all Writs run, all Commissions and Grants are made’.​[97]​ In other words, it mattered little that Cromwell was not a king by name – treason was a crime against the chief magistrate regardless of his title; it was his office as ‘spring of Justice’, not his title, which mattered.​[98]​ 

Even with the option of Protectoral legislation, Glynne believed that his common law definition of treason was correct. He sought to justify legal proceedings by deliberately underplaying the issue of the title of the supreme magistrate. Glynne saw no necessity in the kingly title; no reason why it could not be substituted for another name signifying supreme magistracy. As he would later admit during the kingship debates of April 1657, many judges had ‘gone very far that way’ in the opinion that the title Protector was ‘the same with that of King’ and he would not, for his part, ‘speake my owne opinion of this case’.​[99]​ 

It was all very embarrassing for the Lord Chief Justice; like many of the judges and lawyers who joined him on that committee of MPs he found that in order to defend the Parliamentary settlement he had to go back on himself. The cumulative force was to undermine the legality of previous legal proceedings while simultaneously casting aspersions on the sincerity and commitment of those who now claimed the legal ‘necessity’ of the kingly title. The fact is, before the removal of hereditary government from the proposed constitution, the issue of the title of the supreme magistrate had always been a side-issue; the emphasis continued to be put on hereditary, not kingly, government. Just days before the offer of the Crown, the government presses continued to promote Glynne’s views concerning the relative unimportance of the title. Not only were his arguments at Sindercombe’s trial recorded in the 12 February edition of Mercurius Politicus, but they were also reprinted in a fuller official account entitled The Whole Business of Sindercome, which came into circulation just as Packe’s Remonstrance was presented to the Commons.​[100]​ 

---

The shift in emphasis is captured in an anonymous pamphlet, entitled A Copy of a Letter Written to an Officer of the Army, which appeared in March 1657.  Although given some attention by Firth, this pamphlet has been overlooked by most scholars. In part, the oversight is down to Firth, who provides both an incorrect reference and date for the pamphlet. Rather than being a sort of manifesto for the elections of 1656, as Firth contends, the pamphlet was actually in circulation in the early stages of the debates over the Humble Remonstrance. ​[101]​ Intriguingly, an earlier version of this pamphlet had appeared in December 1654 (another fact missed by Firth), in the midst of the Parliamentary debates over the Instrument of Government. Then, however, it had the subtly different title of A Copy of a Letter Concerning the Election of a Lord Protector Written to a Member of Parliament.​[102]​  Originally conceived in 1654 as an attempt to convince Presbyterian MPs to abandon plans to maintain an elective Protectorate, the 1657 incarnation was aimed squarely at those army officers (and perhaps even Cromwell himself?) who were the greatest sticklers against the notion of a hereditary Protectorate.​[103]​

Although the author of A Copy of a Letter claims to be ‘a true Commonwealths-man, and no Courtier’, the publication has all the hallmarks of being the work of someone close to the centre of affairs. Both editions of the pamphlet were produced in the printing house of Thomas Newcombe, the publisher of the government newsbooks Mercurius Politicus and The Publick Intelligencer; as well as official reports of Sindercombe’s plot and trial, including The Whole Business of Sindercome. If, as Jason Peacey has suggested, Newcombe’s press was exploited for the propagandist purposes of Thurloe, then A Copy of a Letter captures an important turning point in the constitutional priorities of the future ‘kingship’ group. ​[104]​

The majority of the pamphlet is simply a reprint of the 1654 version. But its arguments, in the context of early 1657, are intriguing. It condemned the notion of an elective Protectorate and stressed that the ‘best course of all’ was to ‘keep not only to one family, but to observe the same order of descent in this chief place of authority, as is by the law of God and the Land observed in other families in the inheritance of all things else’; only then could they find ‘the peace and settlement of these Nations. For to settle it otherwise, were but to unsettle us by that settlement’. The author prayed that the Parliament would follow the advice of Jeremiah 6.16 and ‘ask for the old paths where is the good way, and walk therein, that we may finde rest for out souls’. But, once again, this language of ‘old paths’ was ambiguous and did not mean a simple restoration of kingship. Hereditary government was not necessarily kingly government. The author was adamant that he did not ‘contend... for names, but things’. Although a monarchy was preferable, if the Parliament were ‘to have our Sovereign Magistrate to be called Protector’ the author did ‘like it well’; it was ‘an Office we want’, ‘and do therefore desire he may have that power left him as will enable him to perform it’. As with Glynne during the Sindercombe trial, the author was making clear that the office and title of king were divisible elements; the facets of the old office which suited constitutional reformers could comfortably be grafted on to the title of Lord Protector. ​[105]​

But, by late February 1657, the removal of the hereditary clause from the constitutional settlement had made this line of argument redundant. Indeed, the change seems to have necessitated the late inclusion of a six-page introductory letter to the reader.​[106]​ The argument in this letter contradicts much of what follows in the main body of the pamphlet and provides an alternative solution to the problem of succession and security. 

The letter opens with a string of medieval precedents which demonstrate how succession among kings had only ever been secure when confirmed by Parliament; even if ‘others might in legal appearance have a better title’. As with the medieval past, so in 1657 – Parliament were the kingmakers. It was apparent throughout history that ‘all Parliaments... have ever confirmed and settled the succession in him whose Writs they obeyed in their Summons, however a more apparent Title might seem to rest in some other person yet living’. It was not ancient lineage or hereditary succession that made a king legitimate but whether or not Parliament accepted their authority as the king then in possession. But this could only work if there was indeed a king. In stark contrast to the indifference expressed in the body of the pamphlet, the author of the introductory letter stressed the absolute necessity of the kingly title. Only in that title could there be legal security and political stability for the regime and its supporters. In particular, the author refers to that ‘Oracle of the Law’, Lord Coke, and his explanation of the 1495 statute of Henry VII that ‘none shall be condemned for anything done in obedience to the present King or Soveraign, (for so the words of the Stature are, King or Soveraign;)’ and that ‘this Act is to be understood of a King in possession of the Crown and Kingdom: For if there be a King regnant in possession, although he be Rex de facto & non de jure, yet he is Seignior le Roy within the purview of this Statute’.​[107]​ 

The author was well aware of the shortcomings of the nominative form of succession contained in the Humble Remonstrance. They reminded the reader of Queen Elizabeth’s reign when Parliament did ‘propound how great a storm of calamities would hang over England, if she should put off her mortality, designing no certain successor’.​[108]​ Cromwell, as a non-hereditary monarch, was himself put into the position of the childless Elizabeth; without a designated hereditary successor, the matter was left for him to settle in his lifetime. The problem was what would happen if, like Elizabeth, he was unwilling to confront his mortality and prevaricated to the very end. Yet, the examples of the past demonstrated that kingship – because of the sempiternal nature of that office – offered some assurances for stability even in moments of dynastic uncertainty. History showed that the ruling family had changed many times, but monarchy never died. The succession remained a serious issue but it was not terminal so long as Cromwell held the kingly title – even without a designated successor power would, with Parliament’s connivance, pass from one king in possession to another.

These were precisely the same arguments that would be expressed by the committee of ninety-nine MPs that met with Cromwell in April 1657. William Lenthall, for one, believed Cromwell’s assumption of the Crown would provide a smooth and undoubted transition of power in the future.  ‘I may safely say’, Lenthall exclaimed, ‘that there never was but one King in England’, for ‘the Law doth positively affirm the King never dies’ and ‘the name and thing have a kind... of an immortality’.​[109]​  More importantly, Lenthall believed the ‘word King’ had ‘such essentiall reference to the Law’ that the ‘right of the person’ is never examined; whether he came in ‘de facto or de jure, it hath the same influence upon the peoples right, and the same Advantages to the chief Governor’.​[110]​  Similarly, Sir Richard Onslow reminded Cromwell how, under Henry VII, it was ‘held and declared, that a King de facto was necessarie, and in all alterations from persons and families’. Although the person or family in possession of the Crown had changed many times, Onslow was sure that ‘our Ancestors alwayes retained the Title and the Name’ of king.​[111]​ Under Cromwellian monarchy, the civilians convinced themselves that the mode of succession was unimportant. They could find safety in the law. Whether or not Oliver died without a designated successor, the turbulent examples of the past demonstrated that it was quite possible for Parliament to own or create another as de facto king. 

A Copy of a Letter Written to an Officer therefore captures the moment when thinking on the constitutional settlement moved decisively.  It had originally been conceived as a simple reprint of the 1654 pamphlet designed to promote the hereditary succession then in agitation. But, when that clause was suddenly dropped, the text had to be reworked with a hasty introduction which brushed aside the issue of hereditary succession, and much of the substance of the pamphlet itself, and elevated the importance of the kingly title instead. It highlights perfectly the shift in attitudes towards the settlement in the few weeks between the revelation of Sindercombe’s plot and the emergence of the Humble Remonstrance. Those concerns for security and safety that had worried MPs from the opening of the Parliament did not go away, but it was now the offer of the Crown, not the creation of a hereditary office, which was promoted as the best way to answer these dangers. The hopes and aspirations of the civilian MPs now rested on Cromwell taking the Crown; only then could they find safety and security comparable to the hereditary government they had originally sought.

But Cromwell was unconvinced by their arguments. The title of king was just a ‘name of office plainly implying a Supreme Authoritie’ and could not be ‘stretcht to more’; it was a ‘feather in a hat’. Cromwell could not comprehend the absolute necessity that the committee of ninety-nine MPs attached to the title. He could see arguments of ‘expedience’ and ‘conveniency’ but nothing conclusive.​[112]​ Small wonder: Cromwell had witnessed at first hand the shifting attitudes of those around him towards the kingly title; he knew that just weeks earlier those now debating with him had stressed the superfluous nature of the kingly title. Cromwell argued how past experience had shown that the ‘supreme Authoritie going in another name, and under another title than King’ had already been complied with ‘twice’ – under both a Commonwealth and a Protectorate. No doubt glancing towards Glynne and his legal colleagues, Cromwell was adamant that the ‘lawes did proceed with as much freedome & justice’, if not more, under these new titles as that of king; and that ‘if more of my Lords the Judges were here then now are’, Cromwell was sure that they could attest to it too.​[113]​ Cromwell refused to take the arguments of these men seriously; their previous actions and arguments made them witnesses against themselves.

---

The civilian Cromwellians were left in a precarious situation. By dropping the hereditary clause in deference to Cromwell’s wishes, they had invested all their hopes for a lasting settlement in the non-hereditary monarchy embodied in the Humble Petition and Advice. Everything now hinged on Cromwell taking the title. But Cromwell was just as defiant on the title of king as he had been on the issue of hereditary government – ultimately refusing the title on 8 May 1657. Historians have stressed the fact that the amended kingless version of the Humble Petition and Advice was totally inadequate.​[114]​ With Cromwell keeping his original title of Lord Protector, many of the clauses of the document were left dangerously ambiguous.  But it also impinged critically upon the issue of succession.  Under Cromwellian monarchy, the future of the regime was reasonably secure because of the accepted theory that the king ‘never dies’; but with Cromwell adopting his old title, the situation was left in a cloud of uncertainty. Should the transition of power prove doubtful, there was a real chance that the office of Lord Protector would end with Cromwell – the person and office would die together.  The civilian Cromwellians had set out in early 1657 with a plan for hereditary monarchy; by May 1657 they were left with a settlement that was neither hereditary nor a monarchy. It was the worst of both worlds. They had returned to square one — the whole survival of the regime still rested in the life of one man.

There was simply no security in the revised Humble Petition and Advice by which Cromwell was reinvested as Lord Protector on 26 June 1657. Unsurprisingly, news of a fresh Royalist plot in April 1658, coupled with Cromwell’s continued bouts of ill-health, increased the calls for him to name his successor sooner rather than later. The sense of desperation grew as Cromwell’s fatal illness intensified. Writing to Henry Cromwell on the evening of 30 August, less than four days before Oliver’s death, Thurloe dared to ponder the calamitous outcome ‘if his highnesse should not settle and fix his successor before he dyes’.​[115]​ By the following day, Viscount Fauconberg had even gloomier news, stating bluntly to Henry that his father was ‘now beyond all possibility of recovery’.​[116]​ One final effort to get a formal written designation under the seal of the dying Protector was attempted shortly before 3 September, but to no avail.​[117]​  In the end, it was left to the Council to nominate Oliver’s successor and the fact they chose Oliver’s eldest son speaks volumes. In many ways, it was that outcome that the civilian Cromwellians had wanted all along. Staring down the chasm of the sort of troubled interregnum that many had long feared, the Council closed ranks and, to all intents and purposes, set about proclaiming Richard Cromwell as his father’s kingly, hereditary successor – conspicuously paying lip-service to any formal designation as stipulated under the Humble Petition and Advice.

---

Historians, in failing to take seriously the demands for hereditary succession throughout the later Protectorate, have misunderstood the nature of the offer of the Crown and the genesis of the Parliamentary constitution of 1657. Although Lenthall, Glynne and their fellow members of the committee of ninety-nine MPs would present a seemingly watertight legal case for Cromwell’s acceptance of the kingly title in April 1657, this does not mean these men had first set about constitutional reform with such arguments in mind. ‘Security’ and freeing the Protectorate from its military foundations were the twin concerns of the civilian Cromwellians; the means to achieve these ends were still being worked out throughout the months leading up to the presentation of Packe’s Remonstrance in February 1657. 

Only relatively late in the day did the kingly title become the lynchpin of the new settlement. Ironically, the reason it assumed such central importance was because of the continued resistance of Oliver Cromwell towards the notion of hereditary government.  During the opening months of the second Protectorate Parliament, the title of the supreme magistrate had been an open issue; MPs moved first for a hereditary Protectorate and only later called for hereditary monarchy. Above all, it was hereditary government that they wanted. In January 1657, the conservative civilian MPs recommended kingship primarily because it was a form of hereditary government; they strove to establish a ruling dynasty in order to avoid the likely confusion of a succession crisis. Their concern was survival, not the legality of titles. After Cromwell’s final rejection of the hereditary clause, however, these MPs had to reconceptualise what exactly they meant by kingly government and from where, precisely, the benefits of kingship derived. In doing so, they emphasised the legal necessity of the title of king. The title and office were portrayed as inseparable entities; they were the immortal thread that ran through the political fabric of England. Even though Cromwellian monarchy was not hereditary, it would be secure – power would pass from one king in possession to another, with all the legal certainty and safeguards of the past. It was far from ideal – hereditary government would have been their first choice – but it was an expedient designed to provide the ideological and legal bedrock for the safe passage and longevity of the regime beyond the lifetime of Oliver Cromwell.

The Parliamentary constitution of 1657 was already the product of a compromise long before Oliver Cromwell refused the Crown. For the civilian Cromwellians the inadequate, insufficient nature of the redrafted kingless Humble Petition and Advice, by which Cromwell was reinvested as Protector in June 1657, was compounded by this earlier compromise. By dropping the hereditary succession in deference to Cromwell’s wishes they staked everything on the kingly title. All hinged upon Cromwell becoming king. When this too was rejected, all the security of the constitution was lost with it. Ultimately, the only person truly happy with the outcome would have been Cromwell himself. On all aspects of the constitutional settlement, Cromwell had got his own way; he remained non-hereditary Protector under a Parliamentary constitution which included a nominated assembly of life peers to balance the political and religious excesses of the Commons. But the regime over which he subsequently presided was just as insecure as before; there was no designated successor, no means to legitimise the succession process should Cromwell die before he made his choice. Everything was left hanging on a nomination that never came.
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